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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
appeals from his judgments 
guilty pleas to possession of a stolen vehicle in CR-F12-17453 and grand in 
CR-F12-19904. On appeal, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On September 21, 2012, officers located McKnight ducking into a stolen vehicle 
parked on the street. (PSI, pp.3-4.) McKnight was arrested and charged with 
possession of a stolen vehicle. (41538 R., pp.44-45.) McKnight pleaded not guilty and 
was released on his own recognizance. (41538 R., pp.42, 46-48.) 
While he was out on release, McKnight committed a new felony, stealing a 
woman's Child Support debit card toward the end of October. (PSI, pp.4-5.) McKnight 
was again arrested and was charged with grand theft for stealing the financial card. 
(41537 R., pp.34-35.) The court set bail at $50,000.00. (41537 R., p.25.) 
McKnight entered a global plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to 
the charges in both cases in exchange for the state recommending probation and not 
filing additional charges. (41537 R., p.39; 41538 R., p.52; see also Tr., p.6, L.12 - p.7, 
L.17.) McKnight pleaded guilty to both charges (Tr., p.12, Ls.19-24), and he was 
released on his own recognizance pending sentencing (41537 R., p.40). A presentence 
report was prepared and filed on January 23, 2013. (See PSI, p.1.) McKnight then 
failed to appear at his sentencing hearing on February 25, instead absconding. (See 
41537 R., p.46; 41538 R., p.58.) The court issued bench warrants in each case (id.) 
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and. eventually, McKnight was returned to custody (41537 R., pp.47-48; 41538 R., 
pp.59-60). 
McKnight moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he was incompetent 
to plead guilty. (41537 R., pp.49-50; 41538 R., pp.61-62.) McKnight also requested a 
mental health evaluation (41537 R., pp.51-52; 41538 R., pp.63-64), which the district 
court ordered (41537 R., pp.54-55; 41538 R., pp.66-67). The district court held a 
hearing on McKnight's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Tr., pp.21-32.) Finding 
that McKnight failed to make the required showing to withdraw his guilty pleas, the 
district court denied the motions. (41537 R., p.65; 41538 R., p.77; see also Tr., p.25, 
L.21 - p.27, L.10.) 
The district court entered judgment against McKnight in both cases and 
sentenced him to concurrent unified terms of seven years with two years fixed on the 
possession of the stolen vehicle and the grand theft. (41537 R., pp.70-74; 41538 R., 
pp.82-86.) McKnight filed timely notices of appeal. (41537 R., pp.76-77; 41538 R., 
pp.88-89.) 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order consolidating the cases. 
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ISSUE 
McKnight states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
McKnight's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has McKnight failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mckniaht Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Motions To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas 
Introduction 
Below, McKnight moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he was not 
competent to plead guilty. (41537 R., pp.49-50; 41538 R., pp.61-62.) The district court 
rejected McKnight's assertion, finding that his psychological evaluation supported the 
conclusion that McKnight was competent to plead guilty. (Tr., p.25, L.21 - p.27, L.10.) 
On appeal, McKnight argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
pre-sentencing motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-14.) A 
review of the record and the applicable law, however, supports the district court's 
determination that McKnight failed to carry his burden of establishing a just reason 
entitling him to withdraw his pleas. McKnight has failed to establish an abuse of the 
district court's discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. 
App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are 
supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 
1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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McKnight Failed To Show Either That His Plea Was lnvoluntarv Or That There 
Existed Any Other Just Reason For Withdrawing His Plea 
, a raw a 
sentence is imposed. presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not 
an automatic right, however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 
(1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears the burden 
of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn. Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. 
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must determine, 
as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991); Hanslovan, 
121 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781. If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, 
then the court must determine whether other reasons exist to allow the defendant to 
withdraw the plea. !9.c 
When the motion is made prior to sentencing, the defendant must present a just 
reason for withdrawing the plea. Hanslovan, 121 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; 
McFarland, 130 Idaho at 361, 941 P.2d at 333. The decision to grant or deny a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court. !9.c Where the 
defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea before the imposition of sentence "but after 
[he] has read his presentence report or received other information about his probable 
seruence, the court is to exercise broad discretion, but may temper its liberality by 
weighing the defendant's apparent motive." State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 411, 816 
P.2d 364, 366 (Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). The failure of a defendant to present 
and support a plausible reason, even in the absence of prejudice to the state, will dictate 
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granting withdrawaL State v. \/\Jard, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 
124 Idaho 1, 1 P.2d 51, (1 
McFarland, 130 Idaho at 362, 941 at 334)). 
The district court concluded that McKnight's assertion that he was incompetent 
due to mental health reasons to enter his guilty pleas was disproved by the record and 
therefore did not demonstrate a just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Tr., p.25, L.21 
- p.27, L.10.) This finding is supported by the record. In conjunction with his motions to 
dismiss his guilty pleas, McKnight requested a mental health evaluation. (41537 R., 
pp.51-52; 41538 R., pp.63-64.) The district court ordered the evaluation. (41537 R., 
pp.54-56; 41538 R., pp.66-67.) The mental health evaluator found that McKnight was 
competent. (PSI, pp.46-47.) 
Despite the clear finding that McKnight was competent, McKnight argued that the 
mental health evaluation showed that he had been incompetent when he pleaded guilty. 
(Tr., p.21, L.12 - p.22, L.21.) The district court rejected McKnight's interpretation of the 
mental health evaluation, finding that it in fact supported the opposite conclusion: That 
McKnight was competent when he entered his guilty pleas. (Tr., p.26, Ls.6-21.) The 
district court's finding is again supported by the evidence. First, the psychological 
evaluator never concluded that McKnight previously did have a psychotic disorder; only 
that he could "have met the criteria for diagnosis in the past." (PSI, p.45.) Second, any 
psychotic disorder McKnight could have had would have been substance induced. (Id.) 
But at the time he pleaded guilty, McKnight affirmed that he was not "under the influence 
of any drug, alcohol or medicine." (Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23.) Because McKnight was not 
abusing substances when he entered his guilty pleas, there was no possibility that a 
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potential "substance induced psychotic disorder" may have rendered him incompetent 
when he pleaded guilty. McKnight failed to show a just reason to support his motions to 
withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Though McKnight continues to dispute the district court's factual findings in this 
regard on appeal (see Appellant's brief, pp.11-14), he has failed to show clear error in 
those findings. Because there is no factual basis for McKnight's claim of incompetence, 
the district court's order denying McKnight's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas on that 
ground should be affirmed. 
In addition to reiterating the same argument as raised below, McKnight also 
contends that the district court abused its discretion by requiring McKnight to make an 
increased showing of good cause to withdraw his guilty pleas and that withdrawal 
should be allowed because it would not prejudice the state. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-
14.) Applying the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, all of McKnight's 
arguments fail. 
After the district court had already made its ruling that McKnight failed to show a 
just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, defense counsel noted, "for the record," that 
McKnight had not seen the PSI or been aware of its recommendations before he 
absconded. (Tr., p.27, Ls.14-18.) Even crediting this naked assertion, as the district 
court appears to have done (see Tr., p.27, L.19), that does not show that McKnight was 
not required to make a heightened showing to justify withdrawal of his guilty plea. First, 
the relevant inquiry is whether McKnight was aware of the sentencing recommendations 
before moving to withdraw his guilty plea, not whether he was aware of them before he 
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absconded. There was no argument below that McKnight was still unaware of the 
sentencing recommendations when he moved to withdraw his plea. 
Second, the legal standard for scrutinizing a defendant's motives is broader than 
the defendant merely having read the PSI. As noted above, when a defendant moves 
to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing "but after [he] has read his presentence 
report or received other information about his probable sentence," the court may 
consider "the defendant's apparent motive." Johnson, 120 Idaho at 411, 816 P .2d at 
366 (emphasis added). Whether McKnight had read his PSI or not, he was certainly 
aware that the state was no longer bound to its favorable sentencing recommendations 
due to his absconding. Furthermore, whether McKnight knew what the PSl's specific 
recommendations would be, he apparently knew enough that he felt it necessary to 
abscond and fail to appear for sentencing. 
Finally, McKnight has failed to show that the district court actually "required an 
increased showing of good cause" instead of just correctly stating the legal standard. 
As noted above, McKnight failed as a factual matter to make any showing of cause. His 
only argument was, based on a psychological evaluation conducted several months 
after the fact, that he was not competent to enter his pleas. But, as noted above, the 
district court rejected this argument, finding that the psychological evaluation actually 
supported the opposite conclusion: That McKnight was competent to enter his guilty 
pleas. (Tr., p.26, Ls.6-21.) McKnight's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was denied 
because he failed to show any just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas, with or without a 
heightened standard. 
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McKnight also argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas 
because withdrawal would not prejudice the state. (Appellant's brief, p.14.) Even 
assuming, arguendo, that the state would not be prejudiced by allowing McKnight to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, that inquiry is irrelevant until McKnight shows a just reason to 
withdraw his guilty pleas. McKnight's sole argument-that he was incompetent to plead 
guilty-lacked any factual support and was correctly rejected by the district court. 
Because McKnight failed to show a just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas, the district 
court properly exercised its discretion by denying the motions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying McKnight's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of September, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BEN P. McGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
RJS/pm 
10 
